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Abstract 
Cloud computing is a promising ICT service delivery model that has already had a significant impact on government agencies, 
SMEs and large organisations. Even though its current adoption is moving away from the early stage to the mainstream, many 
organisations are still concern about the additional levels of abstraction that cloud environments introduce. Particularly, this 
additional complexity represents a hurdle in the assessment of ICT readiness for organisational resilience, and no consensus exists 
yet for its analysis. Based on a literature review of cloud computing reference architectures, and organisational resilience and 
business continuity frameworks, this paper suggests a framework to guide research into this field from an operational perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
Cloud computing (CC) is a new way of delivering computing resources. For some, it is the most important 
development in recent times in the field of ICT, while for others, it is only another step towards utility computing. It 
promises numerous benefits and organisations are increasingly turning to these services. IDC forecasts that by 2016, 
US $1 of every US $5 spent on computing will be spent on CC[1]. However, cloud environments (CCE) have also 
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raised various concerns and an increasing number of researchers are developing knowledge about CCE from technical 
to business issues[2]. In the former, issues regarding portability, interoperability and security have been studied [3, 4]. 
In the latter, researchers have been working specifically on economic impact, costs, reasons for adoption and growth 
trends[5]. A topic that incorporates issues from both perspectives, known as availability in CCE, has been identified 
as one of the main obstacles to and opportunities for the growth of CC[6, 7]. Therefore, CC failures and their effects 
in organisational resilience (OR) need to be understood.  
This necessity is also the result of the considerable attention that the OR concept has gained in the last few years[8] 
and, consequently, the increased demand for organisations to exhibit high reliability in the face of adversity. These 
two factors have heightened the need to strengthen the ability of organisations to respond to disruptive incidents when 
working in CCE. Specifically, Herrera and Janczewski[9] discuss previous studies of OR in the ICT context and 
conclude that many avenues are open for research in ICT operational resilience in CCE. Based on this, this paper 
presents a research framework which addresses key issues when studying OR in CCE. The framework is constructed 
from a literature review of CC characteristics derived from well-known reference architectures, and a compilation of 
OR specifications also derived from the most popular OR / Business Continuity (BC) standards and models.  
This paper is in five sections, including this introduction. Section two begins by presenting a brief overview of CC, 
and then describes how the baseline architecture and its characteristics have been defined. In the third section, a set of 
resilience specifications for discussing OR key issues in these environments is presented while the fourth section 
describes the proposed research framework. Each of these middle three sections also discusses relevant methods and 
design decisions. Finally, section five summarises the contributions. 
2. CC baseline architecture  
The baseline architecture serves as a reference point to study how existing OR specifications are affected by the 
CC adoption from an operational ICT perspective. 
2.1. Overview of CC 
The most popular definition of CC is the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) definition: “model 
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources 
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction”[10]. 
Particularly, architectures that are part of this study have adopted it to some extent and there is a strong agreement 
about its three fundamental components: characteristics, service delivery models and service deployment models. (1) 
The five essential characteristics are: on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, 
and measured service; (2) a taxonomy of three service delivery models: infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as 
a service (PaaS) and software as a service (SaaS) and (3) four deployment models describing how these services can 
be shared: private cloud, community cloud, public cloud, and hybrid cloud. Regarding the last two components, some 
architectures have identified a fourth type of model that goes beyond SaaS, known as business process as a service 
(BPaaS) and the majority of them disregard the community model. As this research has adopted the NIST definition, 
it maintains the 5x3x4 original scheme. 
2.2. Baseline reference architecture – Methodology 
A literature review approach was adopted and an online search was conducted in four online databases: ACM 
Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, ProQuest (ABI/INFORM), and ScienceDirect (Elsevier), resulting in the identification 
of eight architectures. These architectures can be grouped into two types according to their main focus: Role-based 
and Layer-based, as show in Table 1. The first step was to review the full text of each architecture. The DMTF was 
discarded because of its exclusive focus on the IaaS model. In the next step, architectures were compared by group. 
This task was relatively simple for the role-based group because there are many shared concepts and elements. On the 
other hand, the consolidation of characteristics into a meaningful set for the layer-based group was more demanding 
given the wider range of approaches. After this step, architectures (1), (2), (5) and (8) were chosen as the most relevant 
and from these the baseline architecture, the main outcome of this process, was compiled. 
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Table 1. Classification of the CC architectures 
Role-based Layer-based 
(1) SP 500-292: NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture[11]  (5) CSA Enterprise Reference Architecture[12] 
(2) IBM Cloud Computing Reference Architecture 2.0[13]  (6) Cloud Computing Reference Architecture – CCRA[14]  
(3) Oracle - Cloud Reference Architecture[15] (7) CISCO Cloud Reference Architecture Framework[16]  
(4) DMTF - Architecture for Managing Clouds[17] (8) IETF Intercloud Architecture Framework-05 ICAF[18]  
2.3. Baseline reference architecture – Components 
CC architectures are defined as generic high-level conceptual models for understanding the basic roles involved in 
CCE and the relationships among them. Specifically, this research has adopted the definition of CC architecture by 
NIST[11] that defines a set of elements that can be used to develop more specific architectures. Based on this, the 
baseline architecture is founded on a three-dimensional approach: principles, actors and architecture building blocks. 
Most of the reference architectures identified guiding principles that are useful when designing a specific CC 
architecture. A summary of the most important principles is presented below [13-15]: 
x Interoperability support: a CC architecture must be elastic, flexible and resilient in order to support multi-tenant 
and multi-landlord platforms.  
x Leverage commonalities: management capabilities with re-use potential should be designed generically and share 
a common platform for the various layers required by both consumers and providers.  
x Design for productivity and efficiency: in order to support CC characteristics the cloud design should be strictly 
oriented to high cloud scale efficiencies and short time-to-delivery/time-to-change.  
x Service management support: service orientation capabilities should be supported as well as their management 
processes throughout their lifecycle. 
x Reliability, availability, security and privacy support: any CCE must conform to standards and regulatory 
requirements; consequently, responsibilities have to be shared among providers and consumers. 
The amount of actors vary from two to five but at least two actors are always recognised as essentials: consumers 
and providers. However, cloud services can be too complex for consumers to manage and increasingly consumers are 
requesting services from cloud brokers instead of contacting providers directly. Therefore, this research has also 
adopted cloud broker, for a total of three main actors[11, 13]. (1) Consumer: a person or organisation that has a 
relationship with, and consumes service instances delivered from a particular cloud provider. (2) Provider: a person, 
organisation, or entity responsible for making a service available to interested parties. (3) Broker: an entity that designs 
and manages the use, performance and delivery of cloud services. It could be seen as a specific type of provider that 
is responsible for designing, creating, packaging, and deploying cloud services for end-user consumption. 
In order to compile the additional components of the studied architectures, this research has adopted the concept 
of architecture building blocks (ABBs). According to The Open Group an ABB describes capabilities to meet business 
needs across an organisation capturing both business and technical requirements[19]. All the identified ABBs can play 
an important role for all the actors, however, they are grouped by actor according to their relevance.  
x Service integration compiles processes that enable the integration of cloud services with on-premise services.  
x Service orchestration refers to the composition of system components to support CC providers’ activities. It can be 
divided into access and service delivery; cloud service; cloud resources control and composition; and resources.  
x Business management provides monitoring and administration of the CCE to keep it operating normally. It can be 
divided into two: (1) ICT Operation & Support (ICTOS) that represents a set of technical and operational 
management services to keep the systems going even in the event of a disaster, and (2) Business Support Services 
(BSS) entails the set of business-related services dealing with customer services.  
x Service creation compiles processes and tools to create, deliver and manage value-added services. 
x Operational risk & “consumability” compiles non-functional aspects across the CCE providing a solid context for 
operations and support. 
x Governance is an essential block to maintain control over the CCE: systems, services and humans, which integrates 
activities such as corporate governance, enterprise risk management, and corporate compliance. 
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Consumers, providers and brokers have different degrees of control over a CCE compared to traditional ICT 
systems, where one organisation has control over the whole stack. Therefore, this baseline architecture (see  
Fig. 1) reflects how all three actors collaboratively design, build, deploy, and operate the system. More important, 
all parties share the responsibilities in providing it with adequate protections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Baseline architecture, based on [11-16, 18] 
3. OR high-level conceptual model 
This section presents a brief overview of OR, describes the approach for compiling the specifications and states 
the general context and the specific ICT resilience processes.  
3.1. Overview of OR 
OR emerged in the field of management in the 1990s as an explanation for the ability of organisations to survive 
and also thrive when exposed to external shocks such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks and uncertain environments. 
It has been applied to areas such as crisis management, disasters, high-reliability organisations and ICT. In the latter, 
“mainly to understand how computing systems impact organisational performance, how to assess alternative methods 
and how to establish essential components”[9]. Regardless of the many areas of application, two general perspectives 
are recognised[20]: (1) engineering resilience that aims to maximise “the efficiency of systems and processes to return 
and maintain the system at its desired state” and (2) ecological resilience that aims to design “flexible systems and 
processes that continue to function in the face of disturbances”. As this study is looking at key issues when handling 
disruptive incidents in CCE, an ecological resilience approach has been adopted. 
3.2. OR Requirements – Methodology 
Following a literature review approach, using the same four online databases, six OR/Business Continuity (BC) 
frameworks were identified and classified into two groups, as shown in Table 2. Definitions and general specifications 
were derived from the first group and processes were identified from the second group. 
3.3. OR Specifications 
According to the first group of frameworks, the primary focus of OR is to control organisational behaviour and 
response during times of disruption; making their services resilient. OR is defined as the adaptive capacity in a 
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complex and changing environment that enables it to resist commotions and return to an acceptable level of 
performance in an acceptable period of time after being affected by an event. In other words, OR is the result of 
harmonic and convergent efforts to adapt to and thrive from disruptive incidents (in this research disruptive incidents 
that come from the use of computing power in a CCE). As a result, OR includes both developmental and operational 
activities in order to prevent; to stabilise, to continue critical services, to recover and manage consequences; and to 
improve activities, as shown in Fig. 2.  
Table 2. Classification of the OR / BC frameworks 
General purpose ICT specialized 
(ASIS SPC 1-2009) OR: Security, Preparedness and Continuity Management 
Systems[21] 
(BS ISO/IEC 27031:2011) Information technology. 
Security techniques. Guidelines for information and 
communication technology readiness for BC[22] (NFPA 1600: 2013) Disaster/Emergency Management and BC Programs[23] 
(AS/NZS 5050:2010) BC – Managing disruption-related risk[24] 
(RMM 2010) CERT – Resilience Management Model[25] 
(ISO 22301:2012) Societal security – BC management systems[26] 
 
The first type of activities, preventive activities, deals with strategies designed to minimize an asset’s exposure to 
sources of disruption; examples of such activities are processes, procedures, policies and controls. The second type, 
continue and management consequences activities, includes stabilising, continuing critical functions and recovering 
activities. Thus, it focuses on strategies designed to keep assets operating as close to normal as possible when facing 
disruptive incidents, through strategies such as processes, procedures, polices, plans and controls and, also, on 
strategies that are aimed at returning to routine operations and a full recovery as soon as possible. Lastly, improvement 
activities translate into strategies designed to achieve continual improvement by correcting and/or adopting new 
strategies of both previous types. Consequently, these frameworks follow the “Plan-Do-Check-Act” (PDCA) model 
to plan, establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain and continually improve the effectiveness of an 
organisation’s resilience. The number of stages varies from four to seven and this research has explicitly adopted the 
general structure of the ASIS SPC 1-2009 framework that provides a comprehensive summary in six stages. These 
stages have been slightly modified to capture additional specifications from the other frameworks[21, 23, 24, 26].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Activities vs. Incident Stages adapted from “Relationship of treatments for disruption-related risk” [24] 
The model starts with the “know your organisation” stage that includes an organisation’s strategic objectives, risk 
appetite and internal/external operational constraints for establishing OR objectives and therefore high-level OR 
requirements. After this step, the top management defines policies emphasising their commitment to the protection of 
human, environmental and physical assets; and business and operational continuity. Planning, the next stage, includes 
risk assessment, business impact analysis and their evaluation to assist in making decisions about which elements need 
treatment and the priority for implementation. Based on the previous outcomes, the implementation and operation 
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stage develops and implements plan requirements, and strategies to prevent, handle, control and mitigate disruptive 
incidents. This stage is very important, however, strategies that have not been periodically tested are not really reliable, 
in this aspect lies the importance of the next stage, checking and corrective actions. It basically tests the 
appropriateness and efficacy of the organisation’s OR activities. Finally, the management review stage involves 
regular surveillance in order to provide assurance of ongoing relevance, readiness and effectiveness of OR activities.  
After the OR general context has been outlined, the second part of this section addresses specific ICT elements 
related with OR based on two frameworks: the BS ISO/IEC 27031 Information technology — Security techniques - 
Guidelines for ICT readiness for business continuity [22], and the Resilience Management Model (RMM) [25]. The 
former encompasses all types of events that could have an impact on ICT infrastructure and systems, and introduces 
a management system to address ICT in support of a broader BC management system. It describes a systematic process 
to achieve a specific objective; however, it does not address explicit operational processes to improve and measure 
OR as the latter does. As this study is looking at the key areas where researchers can study how the characteristics of 
CC impact ICT operational resilience, the RMM has been adopted as the main ICT specialized framework. 
The RMM developed by Carnegie Mellon University’s Computer Emergency Response Team seeks to manage 
ICT operational resilience across three disciplines: security management, business continuity and ICT operations 
management. It has 26 process areas that are organised into four high-level categories: engineering, enterprise 
management, operations, and process management (see Table 3); it also defines six levels of resilience maturity: 
incomplete, preferred, managed, defined, quantitatively managed, and optimised.  
Table 3. RMM processes by high-level categories, based on [25] 
Enterprise management Operations 
Communications [COMM] 
Compliance Management [COMP] 
Enterprise Focus [EF] 
Financial Resource Management [FRM] 
Human Resource Management [HRM] 
Organizational Training and Awareness [OTA] 
Risk Management [RISK] 
External Dependency Management [EXD] 
Access Management [AM] 
Identity Management [ID] 
Incident Management and Control [IMC] 
Vulnerability Analysis and Resolution [VAR] 
Environmental Control [EC] 
Knowledge and Information Management [KIM] 
People Management [PM] 
Technology Management [TM] 
Process management Engineering 
Monitoring [MON] 
Organizational Process Definition [OPD] 
Organizational Process Focus [OPF] 
Measurement and Analysis [MA] 
Resilience Requirements Development [RRD] 
Resilience Requirements Management [RRM] 
Asset Definition and Management [ADM] 
Controls Management [CTRL] 
Resilient Technical Solution Engineering [RTSE] 
Service Continuity [SC] 
4. Research framework - key issues when studying OR in CCE  
As organisations move their ICT services into CCE a better understanding of what OR means for this type of 
environment is required. The proposed research framework illustrates some key areas where researchers can study 
how the adoption of CC, as an ICT service delivery model, impacts the existing ICT resilience processes and provides 
a starting point to identify new processes as required. Based on the literature discussed in the previous sections, this 
section presents a multi-level framework. This framework captures key issues when studying ICT operational 
resilience in CCE from the macro level of CC’s ABBs to the micro level of organisational resilience capabilities. The 
macro level, architectural, captures the three dimensions in which the baseline architecture is founded focusing on the 
ABBs. The micro level, capabilities, analyses linkages among resilience process areas in order to identify 
dependencies that should be considered when studying a specific process area.  
4.1. Architectural level - Locating ICT resilience processes in the CC baseline architecture 
This level shows what kind of ICT resilience processes support certain ABB capabilities. It aims to provide a bridge 
between current ICT resilience processes and high-level cloud service requirements and structures, which enables 
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researchers to identify where the main concerns arise in a generic CCE as shown in Fig. 3. Specifically, it shows how 
the 26 processes are clustered in four ABBs as briefly explained below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Proposed research framework – Architectural level 
At the service orchestration block, which provides core capabilities from the physical layer to the access layer to 
support cloud services, only one process is placed. The “Resilient Technical Solution Engineering” (RTSE) states that 
applications “must be specifically designed and developed with consideration of the types of threats they will face, 
the operating conditions and changing risk environment in which they will operate”[25]. CC characteristics such as 
the number of distributed components and their usual large scale, make this topic a critical area of research. Therefore, 
traditional software reliability engineering techniques such as fault prevention, fault removal, fault tolerance, and fault 
forecasting should be studied in order to find a feasible approach for building highly reliable cloud applications. In 
CC, this topic has mainly focused on the first two techniques[27]. 
The BSS block provides guidance on understanding who the service customers are, the service offerings that are 
required to meet their needs, and the ICT capabilities and resources that are required to develop these offerings. This 
ABB mostly clusters enterprise-wide competences that help an organisation to improve and develop over the long 
term. For this type of competence researchers may need to extend traditional ICT governance knowledge to cloud 
governance[28] and consider the involvement of business partners for establishing a robust communication plan over 
the life of the relationship[29]. 
The ICTOS block carries out operational tasks in order to make sure that cloud services are delivered effectively 
and efficiently. Many resilience concerns arise in this ABB. The first potential research area is the shared 
establishment and management of an appropriate level of control over the different types of assets (people, facilities, 
information, and technology) among the CC actors. Also, regular activities such as identity and access management 
seem to be a potential area of research given privacy concerns, especially for the multi-tenant deployment models[30]. 
Finally, the establishment of processes in order to identify and analyse events, detect incidents, and determine an 
appropriate coordinated response is considered critical in CCE[31].  
The Operational risk & “consumability” block is the ABB that collects non-functional aspects that should be 
viewed from an end-to-end perspective in order to provide the core components to safeguard cloud services. Research 
areas focusing on the strengthening of resilience capacities to (1) determine appropriate requirements, control selection 
and oversee continuity of operations[32] and (2) ensure that the consumer organisation has the capability to manage 
the risk of unmet requirements from providers and brokers[33] should be considered. Therefore, not only does a 
researcher need to understand how to strengthen these resilience capabilities, they also need to consider new forms of 
monitoring that allow consumers to ensure compliance with relevant standards[34]. 
The architectural level illustrates some important areas for research into ICT operational resilience within CCE, 
however, it leaves out the interactions among processes that can also be helpful when studies focus on accomplishing 
a specific goal. For instance, after the “Service Orchestration” BB has been recognised as a critical research area in 
order to improve the reliability of cloud services, researchers need to link together the process areas that contribute to 
satisfy this particular objective. For this example, RTSE is linked on specific capabilities of areas such as RRD, RRM, 
ADM, SC, EXD, TM and MON[25] to effectively develop resilient services. Therefore, understanding these 
relationships can help researchers in developing research roadmaps. 
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4.2. Capabilities level - Identifying potential impact levels introduced by CCE on the interactions among ICT 
resilience processes 
This level analyses linkages among resilience process areas in order to identify dependencies that should be 
considered when conducting a comprehensive study of a specific process area or when pursuing a specific resilience-
related objective. In order to identify key dependency issues, two main steps were followed: first, based on the RMM 
model, a linkages-matrix among resilience-processes M has been defined. This matrix is the result of consolidating 
the section “related-processes” in the RMM, which are part of the process descriptions and “list references to other 
processes and reflects the high-level relationships among capabilities”[25]. Thus, this section identifies which other 
capabilities are complementary and should be considered when improving a specific process area. For instance, for 
the service continuity [SC] process “the consideration of consequences as a foundational element for developing 
service continuity plans is addressed in the Risk Management [RISK] process”[25]or in other words the SC process 
area depends on a subset of the RISK process area capabilities. The main characteristics of matrix M are: 
x It is a square matrix, where each row and column represent one of the 26 ICT resilience processes  
x An entry in the matrix mi,j represents a high-level relationship between processes i and j. (1) entries in the main 
diagonal are invalid, (2) entries in the i-th row show complementary capabilities that the i-th process requires to 
satisfy its set of goals, and (3) entries in the j-th column show what processes depend on process j capabilities. 
x Empty cells show non-existing relationships between two processes. 
As a result of the second step the matrix M’ has been created (see Fig. 4). It shows the result of a systematic 
assessment of the potential impact of CC adoption on the ICT resilience processes and their linkages. This assessment 
has been conducted based on the CC baseline architecture and the RMM process areas documentation, specifically 
sections “Purpose” and “Specific Practices by Goal”[25]. Three qualitative types of impact are defined: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Proposed research framework – Capabilities-level linkages-matrix 
 Low impact when the interaction between two processes is essentially the same in CCEs. For instance, the 
entry M’SC,OTA (relationship between the processes SC and OTA); defined as “providing training for staff involved in 
service continuity plan testing and execution is addressed in the Organizational Training and Awareness process 
area”[25]; may need to modify training content but basically OTA does not require new mechanisms or additional 
activities in order to support SC. It also means that regardless of the impact that the adoption of CC could have on the 
SC process, its interaction with the OTA process will not add extra impact. 
 Medium impact when the interaction between two processes is partially affected by the CC adoption. For 
instance, for the entry M’SC,CTRL; described as “the development, implementation, and management of an internal 
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control system to prevent risks and disruptive events is addressed in the Controls Management process area” [25]; 
CTRL faces its own changes when establishing control objectives. Therefore, its interaction with SC is also affected. 
This also means that regardless of the impact that the adoption of CC has on the SC process, its interaction with the 
CTRL process will add extra impact. 
 High impact when the interaction between two processes is very affected by the CC adoption. For instance, 
for the entry M’SC,ADM; described as “the association of assets to the high-value services they support is performed in 
the Asset Definition and Management process area” [25]; ADM faces important changes given that two out of the 
four types of organisational assets, information and technology, are the assets where CC focuses as an ICT service 
delivery model and its characteristics are directly related to them. Therefore, its interaction with SC is highly affected. 
It also means that regardless of the impact that the adoption of CC could have on the SC process, its interaction with 
the CTRL process will add significant extra impact. 
This matrix allows for visual identification of critical research areas based on columns with numerous high impact 
entries such as risk management (RISK), asset definition and management (ADM), and monitoring (MON). For 
instances, determining how well the current practices on risk management are aligned to the CC characteristics should 
be a critical starting point not only because more than half of the processes depend on its capabilities but also because 
an improvement in this process will multiply its positive impact in the whole system. On the other hand, a column 
with no high impact entries such as organisational process definition (OPD) or focus (OPF) shows that as a 
consequence of the adoption of CC as an ICT delivery model, the establishment, maintenance and improvement of 
organisational processes should need limited additional research efforts, in order to maintain and improve OR.  
Similarly, rows with numerous high impact entries, such as controls management (CTRL), point out what are the 
complementary capabilities that an ICT resilience process should consider when working within a CCE at first, given 
the additional and significant impact that these interactions potentially can generate.  
5. Conclusion 
As organisations move their ICT services into CCE a better understanding of what OR means for this type of 
environment is required. This paper presents a multi-level research framework designed to address the major issues 
related to the study of OR in CCE from an ICT perspective. The purpose of this framework is to identify the major 
differences in studying ICT operational resilience within CCE versus an in-house environment. Therefore, this 
framework can support the design of a research roadmap from the academic perspective and it can also guide 
practitioners’ efforts in understanding how the adoption of CC can impact the risk of business disruption of an 
organisation and specifically, the assessment of ICT’s operational resilience. Currently, part of this framework is being 
applied to analyse real incidents in New Zealand companies working within CCE through walkthrough and tabletop 
exercises, in order to assess its applicability. 
The issues provided in this article are based on a literature review of CC architectures and existing OR 
specifications. However, it is a suggested, not all-inclusive, roadmap of current key issues in this area yet, and it is 
expected that this framework can be used to understand the relationships between CCE and ICT operational resilience. 
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